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Rafiq Hariri: A Journalist’s Account of the Billionaire-Politician
The investigation into the assassination of Rafiq
Hariri, which started in February 2009, is set to revive
interest in Lebanon’s former prime minister. A good
starting point to read up on the billionaire-politician
is Nicholas Blanford’s Killing Mr. Lebanon. It is a
journalistic introduction to Lebanese politics from the
civil war (1975-1990) to 2006 intended for a general
audience.
In the first chapter, Blanford gives a minute-by-
minute account of the morning of Hariri’s assassina-
tion. In the second, he describes Hariri’s wartime
diplomacy in the 1980s as an envoy of Saudi Arabia’s
King Fahd. Hariri used money to gain a seat at the
top table: “For Hariri, money was a tool in negoti-
ation as much as a plumber uses a wrench to stop
a leak or a sculptor uses a chisel to fashion a block
of wood” (p. 30). Hariri’s funds came from Saudi
Arabia, either directly from the king or from Hariri’s
personal wealth accumulated through his work as a
contractor for the Saudi royals. Blanford gives some
revealing indications about Saudi’s Lebanon policy,
Hariri’s role in executing or even shaping it, relations
with the Americans, and the rivalry with revolution-
ary Iran and its Lebanese ally Hizbullah. However,
Blanford never explores these issues and the reader is
left wondering what exactly it was that Saudi Arabia
was trying to achieve in Lebanon and why the Saudi
royals used a contractor as“their man”in the country.
The third chapter describes Hariri’s role as prime
minister from 1992 to 1998 and the corruption asso-
ciated with reconstruction under Syrian domination.
Blanford contrasts the “mafia-style racketeering” of
the Syrian regime with the billionaire’s “bribery and
cronyism,” which he considers to have been essen-
tially harmless (pp. 60-64).Yet if Hariri used money
“like a wrench,” then surely it is important to trace
the mechanisms by which money was created in
the postwar economy, Hariri’s role in this, and how
this shaped his politics. Hariri was in control of
the institutional levers of the economy. He placed
“smart technocratic Lebanese professionals” (p. 4)
at the head of the Central Bank, the finance min-
istry, and the Council of Development and Recon-
struction (CDR). The government borrowed heavily
from domestic commercial banks, thus stabilizing the
currency by drawing in Lebanese-pound deposits.[1]
However, very little of this money went into recon-
struction; instead the policy represented a massive
transfer of wealth to commercial banks and their de-
positors, and bank lending to private business was
“crowded out.” Blanford mentions this process in
passing (p. 48). Hariri’s role in the reconstruction of
Beirut’s city center–a scheme heavily driven by profit
maximization–is also somewhat glossed over. By es-
chewing a detailed analysis of these two rent-creation
mechanisms, Blanford misses a chance to examine
how the billionaire-politician continued to use money
“like a wrench” in the postwar era. While Hariri
was in charge of government finance and reconstruc-
tion, former militia leaders, Syrian allies, and the pre-
war political elite used “service ministries” (e.g., ed-
ucation, health, or refugees) as patronage resources.
Close Syrian allies controlled foreign affairs and se-
curity agencies. Lebanon’s postwar institutions were
thus divided up among different groups and Hariri
was a central actor both in the carving up and in
claiming his share of the pie. Blanford’s contention
that Hariri was merely a hapless victim of Syrian
racketeering–which certainly did exist–should there-
fore be treated with caution.
Chapters 4 and 5 track the decline of Hariri’s in-
fluence in Syria due to the rise of a young “Alawite
faction” (p. 55) around president-to-be Bashar al-
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Assad, which sidelined Hariri’s primarily Sunni allies,
all from an older generation. This led to the elec-
tion of pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud as a coun-
terweight to the prime minister in 1998. The even-
tual “showdown” between the “Hariri camp” and the
“Alawite faction” occurred in 2004, when the Syrian
regime sought an unconstitutional extension of La-
houd’s term against Hariri’s opposition. In Septem-
ber 2004 the United Nations Security Council passed
the U.S.-French sponsored resolution 1559, demand-
ing presidential elections without foreign (i.e., Syrian)
interference but also the disarmament of Hizbullah
and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.
Blanford maintains that Hariri opposed the latter
two clauses but the Syrian regime accused Hariri of
using his international connections–particularly with
French President Jacques Chirac–to pressure Syria.
Blanford writes that Hariri sought reconciliation with
the Syrian regime through secret late-night meet-
ings with Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasral-
lah. Moreover, Hariri refused to openly align himself
with Lebanon’s anti-Syrian opposition. According to
Blanford, Hariri’s assassination is tragic because his
efforts at reconciliation went unheeded.
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with Hariri’s assassina-
tion in February 2005 and its aftermath. Blanford
holds Syria’s “Alawite faction” and Lebanon’s secu-
rity agencies responsible. U.S. neoconservatives used
the international investigation into the assassination
to pressure Syria but Blanford does not discuss the
potentially problematic nature of this type of politi-
cized international justice. Hariri’s son Saad as-
sumed political leadership of the Sunni community
and joined the predominantly Christian and Druze
anti-Syrian coalition in organizing large-scale demon-
strations. The biggest protest happened on March
14, 2005, earning the coalition the name “March
14.” They confronted “March 8,” led by the Shi-
ite Hizbullah, which relied on an alliance with Syria
to continue its armed struggle against Israel. Blan-
ford laments the rising sectarianism among the two
camps, yet he does not fully explore Rafiq Hariri’s
own role in sectarian politics: “Although he was
the undisputed leader of Lebanon’s Sunnis, his tal-
ent, charm and muscle resonated across the confes-
sional divide, making him a national figure capable
of transcending Lebanon’s sectarian hurdles to steer
the country independently from the clutches of Syria”
(p. 210). This characterization does little justice
to the complexities of sectarian leadership. Blanford
does not examine how the Saudi billionaire became
the “undisputed leader” of his community, what role
his charities played, or how Hariri sidelined the es-
tablished Sunni elite who resented “this immensely
wealthy Saudi-backed newcomer” (p. 46). By con-
sidering these questions, Blanford could have exam-
ined the role that Lebanese political leaders play in
reproducing sectarian and clientelist discourses and
practices. Blanford mentions the growing sectarian
tension between Sunnis and Shiites and accusations
against Saad Hariri of pandering to sectarian preju-
dice in the parliamentary elections of 2005 (pp. 172-
173), but fails to follow up on these accusations. Fi-
nally, an epilogue describes the author’s experience of
the Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006, and concludes that
Hariri could have helped contain the war had he been
alive.
Blanford relies almost exclusively on interviews
conducted after Hariri’s assassination. His choice of
interviewees is strongly tilted towards former allies,
advisors, and prote´ge´s of Rafiq Hariri such as Johnny
Abdo, Nohad Mashnouq, Fouad Siniora, and Abdel-
Halim Khaddam. Many of these individuals are now
close to Hariri’s son. Almost all the interviews were
conducted in the midst of the political struggle be-
tween members of March 14 and March 8. Blan-
ford does not pause to reflect what effect this may
have had on the narratives of his interlocutors. Ac-
tually, some of the most interesting insights of the
book come from those interviewees who were not an
integral part of the“Hariri camp.” Blanford describes
members of March 14 in highly positive terms: Nayla
Mouawad is “an energetic and attractive woman” (p.
143), Saad Hariri is “tall and well-built” (p. 168),
the late Gibran Tueni had “dark 1930s-matinee-idol
looks” (p. 182). In contrast, Hariri’s opponents are
described as physically unattractive and socially in-
ept: Michel Aoun is a “short, egotistical army gen-
eral” (p. 170) while Omar Karami is “colorless” (p.
41). Emile Lahoud’s surprisingly positive image has
been created by a public relations campaign (p. 68).
These characterizations stand in the way of dispas-
sionate analysis.
Blanford should be applauded for digging up a lot
of interesting material about Hariri. He constructs
the most coherent account of Hariri’s life in the En-
glish language thus far, which is no mean feat. How-
ever, Blanford fails to evaluate his sources properly
and he leaves many questions unasked. The book can
be useful for researchers interested in the billionaire-
politician or in Lebanese politics since the 1980s but
they will have to evaluate the interview material that
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Blanford presents with a more dispassionate eye.
Note
[1]. For an account of Hariri prote´ge´s heading gov-
ernment agencies, see Guilain Denoeux and Robert
Springborg, “Hariri’s Lebanon: Singapore of the Mid-
dle East or Sanaa of the Levant?” Middle East Pol-
icy 2 (1998): 162. The following account of postwar
government finance policy is based on Toufik K. Gas-
pard, A Political Economy of Lebanon, 1948 - 2002
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 210-221; and Samir Makdisi,
The Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and
Development (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 90-159.
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